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DRAWING BACK FROM THE ABYSS, OR
LESSONS LEARNED FROM COUNT VON COUNT
John Henry Schlegel
Because I once wrote about American Legal Realism and
simultaneously participated in the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, I am regularly asked to comment on the relationship
between the two. I usually decline as most of the askers have
some ax they wish me to join in grinding. However, the
inauguration of this new journal, participating in the critical ether
common to both movements, plus your guest editor's generous
offer to allow me to speak about whatever I wish, have
unaccountably freed me to make the following observation.
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) died exactly as Realism did. Each,
when looking over the abyss of its own critique, drew back in
horror.
Before exploring this aspect of the intellectual relationship
between Realism and CLS, it is important to note a significant
difference between the two movements. Realism, unlike CLS,
captured the State. The Depression occurred while the Realists
were active, and the electoral triumph of Roosevelt's New Deal
provided a receptive outlet for Realist ideas about law and
administrative government. In this way, though Realism began as
a movement of legal academics who were responding to a
formalist jurisprudence of the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries, it did not remain only an academic movement. In
contrast, CLS began as a movement of legal academics who were
responding to the jurisprudence called "legal process," and
remained an academic movement because this country continued
the conservative electoral turn it began in 1968. Thus, the politics
that underlie Realism became a part of public discourse, while the
politics that underlie CLS remained academic. This is not to say
that CLS's politics were unimportant, at least to most of the
movement's participants, but only that the more significant legacy
of CLS has been its anti-disciplinarity, its claim that the standard
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methods of analysis that underpin legal scholarship did not then,
and do not now, produce determinate solutions to legal questions.
With that difference understood, I turn to the similarity in the
academic demise of both movements.
Duncan Kennedy once said to me that American Legal
Realism disappeared like water poured into sand . . . after the
event was over, the ground was just a little bit damp. The same
thing could be said about CLS. If we are all Realists now, in the
sense that we all can see through doctrine to underlying social
practices, we are also all Crits now, in the sense that we all can see
structures of privilege and domination in any branch of law. At
the least, Realism and CLS offer tools for use by any law schooled
person when and where and for what purpose such a person
wishes to deploy them. Yet the Realist movement, like the CLS
movement, is dead. How can both of these things - life and death
- simultaneously be true?
Life is easy to explain. Law is unsystematically, but
relentlessly parasitic on its past. As Faulkner said in The Reivers,
"Nothing is ever lost. It's all too valuable." As a people of law and
lawyers, whatever we have said or done is available for others to
attempt to use at a later time and for later purposes. Realism, and
by a parity of reasoning, CLS, will be alive so long as law-trained
individuals can and do use its distinctive critical tools in the
course of, and as support for, the arguments they choose to make.
Death is less easy. To begin with, one needs to understand
that law as we know it, though regularly described as protection
for the People from the depredations of the State, is better
understood as protection for the middle classes (sometimes
rendered as the bourgeoisie) from the assertions to primacy of the
upper classes, and the claims to social and economic participation
of the lower. The upper classes embody the cultural affirmation of
their claims and so don't need law to assert them; theirs is a
position of social and economic power. The middle classes use
law to moderate these claims, which are mostly for immunity from
middle class norms of fair-play. The lower classes lack cultural
affirmation of their claims and so wish law to affirm them; theirs
is a position of social and economic need. The middle classes use
law to cabin these claims, which are mostly for access to middle
class assets.
Thus reliant on law, the middle classes use the ideology of
the rule of law to establish their lack of self-interest in the
formulation of the rules of law that they treasure as talismans for
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protection from bad dreams, dreams of rapacious princes or angry
mobs. The rules, the middle classes say, apply uniformly to, and
so protect, all of the State's citizens. In the Nineteenth Century,
this claim of disinterest was supported with the formalist's
assertion that the content of the rules of law was logically entailed
from a limited set of legal principles. In the last half of the
Twentieth Century this claim was supported with the legal process
school's assertion that the content of the rules of law was
substantively entailed from a limited set of legal policies.
The Realists, largely from a position as political liberals,
attacked the formalist's claim of disinterest by demonstrating, to
their satisfaction at least, that legal decisions were not logically
entailed from the set of legal principles. Indeed, the Realists
asserted that judges reached their decisions by using precedents
selectively, and actively shaped those that they used to reach
decisions that might have been otherwise. All such efforts sought
to obscure the values that led to, and were ultimately served by,
their decisions. We Crits, largely from positions to the left of
political liberalism, attacked the legal process scholars' claim of
disinterest by demonstrating, to our satisfaction at least, that legal
decisions were not substantively entailed from a set of legal
policies. Indeed, we Crits asserted that judges always had
available to them contradictory policies that could be used to
justify decisions that might have been otherwise. Again, such
efforts sought to obscure the values that led to, and were
ultimately served by, their decisions.
There was, however, a problem in each of these critiques, a
problem that cut to the quick for the Realists and us Crits. Most
people do not become law professors because the job is more
plausible than sleeping in a cardboard box. They become law
professors because they love law, or perhaps the idea of law, or at
least the possibility of law. They desire to be among the elect who
may bear witness to the truth of law's potential as a principle of
government. In a very real sense, they want to bring about better
law, law that will both fulfill its role as arbiter of equality among
citizens and secure substantive justice for all, each an aspect of,
and so implicit in, the notion of the rule of law. For the Realists,
this desire was substantively directed toward expanding the
middle classes to include the upper portion of the working class.
For us Crits, it was toward expanding the middle classes still
further to include, not just more of the working class, but also




Unfortunately, the separate critiques of law offered at
different times by both the Realists and us Crits made it very
difficult to ground either group's claims about equality or
substantive justice. If it was not logical entailment from legal
principle that assured equality or substantive justice, what was it?
If it was not entailment from legal policy that assured equality or
substantive justice, what was it? There was a terrible abyss here
that a quite well-intentioned, vigorously pursued critique had
opened.
Given the abyss that each group of scholars had separately
opened up, it is not wholly surprising that each was separately
called "nihilist" by defenders of the existing middle classes. And,
each group vigorously denied the charge, knowing full well the
strongly held values that animated its critique. So, the question
presented for each was how to continue to affirm critique and
simultaneously to establish a ground on the basis of which each
might argue for the reform of law that was implicit in its values.
Here, different scholars followed different paths. Among
the Realists, some gave up scholarship and instead became judges
or administrators, securing for themselves the possibility of self-
actualizing their value commitments. For the rest, the career of
Karl Llewellyn offers the best summary of other disciplinary
possibilities on the basis of which to continue critique and ground
reform. After offering a strong critique in his lectures for law
students called The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn tried social science
research in an unfinished set of pieces on divorce. He then turned
to institutional economics/sociology in a piece on the
Constitution. Next, he moved to historical studies in several pieces
on the law of sales. Thereafter, he tried social theory in an
unfinished work called Law In Our Society. Finally, he softened
his original critique significantly in The Common Law Tradition,
a work in which he combined his chastened critique with a faith
both in the immanence of the rules of law in the social milieu and
in a particular style of judging that he called the "Grand Style."
No one among us Crits had a run at trying alternative
groundings for reform like Llewellyn's. Only one was able to try
self-actualization by accepting the offer of a judgeship. A few
simply ignored the problem and kept on working. Several stuck
with the historical studies that were a first love. Some took shelter
in the assertion that group identity provided sufficient grounding.
Duncan Kennedy, in many ways our fearless leader, though to my
knowledge he still has not even temporarily swapped jobs with a
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janitor, kept pushing various species of critique, only to follow
Llewellyn and offer a surprisingly chastened version of it in A
Critique ofAdjudication - Fin du Siecle, a book that also affirmed
many possible groundings.
In some ways mine is a very sad story, a story about the
strength of principle and the failure of nerve, an unwillingness to
jump into an obvious abyss, as Kierkegaard would have all
humans do, for fear that doing so would endanger the strong
commitment to a substantive vision of what law might become.
Curiously, though the Realists had no one to help them make this
leap of faith, we Crits might have learned from our children. They
know of Sesame Street's Count von Count and what he taught -
Counting never stops. One simply has to go forward in the hope
that from the counting, one may finally learn something, if only
the next number.
Kant, the man who formalized critique, may have thought
otherwise, but as best as can be known, critique, like counting,
never stops, though after a long time, it may seem to leave behind
little but a thin gruel. Still, it should be understood that if we
accept Kierkegaard's wager, and turn the sharp knife of critique on
our own preferred reforms of law with the same rigor that we turn
that knife on the rules that the defenders of the current status quo
believe protect the middle classes, our most cherished values will
not be any more vulnerable than theirs. If we who trumpet
critique today believe that the values that we fight to have
instantiated in law are better than the current alternative, then we
ought to be willing to fight for them, recognizing that neither we
nor our opponents have a better way to ground our preferences
than the sum of the arguments that we can offer, shabby as they
may be, after critique has rent the garments in which we dress
them. The later works of the late Alan Freeman, one of my Crit
friends, point in this direction. Alan, who wrote about the wisdom
of Dr. Seuss, knew about Count von Count as well. Perhaps we
ought to try to follow his lead. A fair fight. No trump cards. If we
are so bright.., well, better not go there.
